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BANKRUPTCY-CRIMINAL LAW-SENTENCING-RESTITUTION-DIS-
CHARGE-DRUNK DRIVING VICTIMS' PROTECTION AcT-After the
United States Supreme Court decided that criminal restitution
sentences were dischargeable debts under Chapter 13 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, Congress overruled the Court's decision and amended
the Code accordingly.
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v Davenport,
US -, 110 S Ct 2126 (1990).
In the fall of 1986, Edward and Debora Davenport pleaded
guilty to welfare fraud in the criminal division of the Court of
Common Pleas of Bucks County, Pennsylvania.' The court sen-
tenced the Davenports to one year of probation, conditioned upon
restitution to the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare.2 The Dav-
enports were ordered to remit their monthly restitution payments
to the Adult Probation and Parole Department of Bucks County.3
The next spring, the Davenports filed a petition under Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code,' in the United States Bankruptcy
1. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v Davenport, - U.S. - , 110 S
Ct 2126, 2129 (1990); See also, In Re Johnson Allen, 871 F2d 421, 422 (3d Cir 1989) (Daven-
port Third Circuit consolidated opinion); Davenport v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, De-
partment of Public Welfare, 89 Bankr 428, 429 (E D Pa 1988) (Davenport District Court
opinion); Davenport v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare (In
re Davenport), 83 Bankr 309, 310 (Bankr E D Pa 1988) (Davenport Bankruptcy Court opin-
ion). The Davenports entered their guilty pleas on September 17, 1986. Davenport, 110 S Ct
at 2129.
2. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2129. The Davenport's were convicted of welfare fraud
pursuant to 62 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 481(c) (Purdon 1968 & Supp). Davenport, 110 S Ct at
2129.
3. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 310. Pursuant to 62 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 481(c), the Dav-
enports were ordered to make restitution payments of $208.00 per month, beginning in De-
cember, 1986, until they repaid $2,072.40, which equalled the amount they had defrauded
the Welfare Department. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 310. The Davenports were ordered to
remit their monthly payments to the Probation Department, who would then forward the
payments to the Welfare Department, pursuant to 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1106(e) (Purdon
1983 & Supp). Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2129.
4. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 310. 11 USC § 1301 et seq (West 1978). References here-
inafter to the "Bankruptcy Code," the "Code," or the "new Code" refer to the current
Bankruptcy Code, enacted in 1978 pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act. 11 USC § 101,
et seq.
The following is a general description of Chapter 13 from the House Report relative to its
enactment:
The purpose of Chapter 13 is to enable an individual, under court supervision and
protection, to develop and perform under a plan for the repayment of his debt over
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Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.5 At the time the
Davenports commenced their bankruptcy proceeding, they had not
made a single restitution payment and appeared to have no inten-
tion of doing so in the future. e The Davenports' bankruptcy peti-
tion listed their criminal restitution obligation as an unsecured
debt, to be paid as other unsecured debts.' Based on their small
pool of assets, the Davenports presumed that the bankruptcy court
would eventually be forced to discharge their restitution pay-
ments.' That summer, the Probation Department commenced pro-
bation violation proceedings in the Bucks County Court, by filing a
motion to revoke probation on the grounds that the Davenports
an extended period. In some cases, the plan will call for full repayment. In others, it
may offer creditors a percentage of their claims in full settlement. During the repay-
ment period, creditors may not harass the debtor or seek to collect their debts. They
must receive payments only under the plan. This protection relieves the debtor from
indirect and direct pressures from creditors, and enables him to support himself and
his dependents while repaying his creditors at the same time.
The benefit to the debtor of developing a plan of repayment under chapter 13,
rather than opting for liquidation under chapter 7, is that it permits the debtor to
protect his assets. In a liquidation case, the debtor must surrender his nonexempt
assets for liquidation and sale by the trustee. Under chapter 13, the debtor may re-
tain his property by agreeing to repay his creditors. Chapter 13 also protects a
debtor's credit standing far better than a straight bankruptcy, because he is viewed
by the credit industry as a better risk. In addition, it satisfies many debtors' desire to
avoid the stigma attached to straight bankruptcy and to retain the pride attendant on
being able to meet one's obligations. The benefit to creditors is self-evident: their
losses will be significantly less than if their debtors opt for straight bankruptcy.
HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st Seas 118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5963, 6079
(1978).
The Senate Report pertaining to Chapter 13, S Rep No 989, 95th Cong, 2d Seas 13, re-
printed in 1978 USCCAN 5787, 5799 (1978), likewise stated: "The new chapter 13 will per-
mit almost any individual with a regular income to propose and have approved a reasonable
plan for debt repayment based on that individual's exact circumstances."
5. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 310. The Davenports filed their joint, voluntary Chapter
13 petition on May 15, 1987. Id.
Though the Welfare Department, as well as the Adult Probation and Parole Department
of Bucks County ("Probation Department"), received notice of the filing of the Davenports'
Chapter 13 petition, neither filed a proof of claim, as required by Bankruptcy Rule 3001.
Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2129, 2130.
6. Davenport, 89 Bankr at 429.
7. Id. Listing the restitution obligation as a debt was extremely significant. Section
101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "debt" as "liability on a claim." Section 101(4)
defines "claim" as a "right to payment..." Only debts based on claims are dischargeable
in a bankruptcy proceeding. 11 USC § 1328. Therefore, one of the central inquiries in Dav-
enport was: whether a criminal restitution sentence constitutes a "right to payment,"
thereby creating a claim, which generates a debt, which is subject to discharge? See notes
41-66 and accompanying text.
8. Davenport, 89 Bankr at 429. Under section 1328(b) of the Code, a debtor who
cannot satisfy all of his creditors in full may receive a "hardship" discharge after paying as
much to each creditor as possible. 11 USC § 1328(b). See note 4.
Recent Decisions
had failed to comply with their restitution sentence.' The Daven-
ports and their counsel met with probation officials and requested
that the probation violation charges be withdrawn until the bank-
ruptcy issues were settled.10 The Probation Department insisted on
proceeding with the probation violation charges. 1 A probation vio-
lation hearing ensued in the Bucks County Court. 2 The Bucks
County Court denied the Probation Department's motion to re-
voke probation, but also denied the Davenports' request to stay
the restitution payments pending the bankruptcy proceeding.' s
The Bucks County Court simply held that the restitution order
would remain in effect, but subject to an extension of the payment
period.'
4
Meanwhile, the Davenports filed an adversary complaint in the
bankruptcy court seeking: 1) a declaratory judgment that the resti-
tution obligation was a dischargeable debt, and 2) an injunction
preventing the Probation Department from undertaking any fur-
ther efforts to collect on the obligation." After a hearing, the bank-
ruptcy court entered an order and opinion holding that the Daven-
ports' restitution obligation to the Probation Department was an
unsecured debt, dischargeable pursuant to the Davenports' Chap-
ter 13 plan.'
The bankruptcy court's decision focused on some crucial attrib-
utes of Chapter 13 of the new Bankruptcy Code.17 A "debt" is de-
fined in the new Code as "liability on a claim." 8 A "claim" is de-
9. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 310. The Probation Department filed a motion to revoke
probation in the Bucks County Court on July 2, 1987 and scheduled an informal hearing
with the Davenports. Id.
10. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 310. The meeting between the Davenports and the Pro-
bation Department was originally scheduled for July 20, 1987. On July 20, 1987, the Daven-
ports, through their bankruptcy counsel, requested withdrawal of the Department's proba-
tion violation action pending the resolution of the bankruptcy matter. The meeting was
rescheduled for August 6, 1987. At that meeting, the Probation Department formally re-
fused to withdraw their probation violation action. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2129, 2130.
11. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 310.
12. Davenport, 871 F2d at 422. The violation of probation hearing took place on Oc-
tober 19, 1987. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. See also, Davenport, 89 Bankr at 429. The payment period was extended from
one to three years. Id.
15. Davenport, 110 S Ct 2126-27. The Davenports commenced their adversary action
on August 12, 1987. Davenport, 89 Bankr at 429.
16. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 309, 317. The bankruptcy court's order was entered on
March 8, 1988. Id.
17. Id at 310-17.
18. Id at 310; 11 USC § 101(11).
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fined as a "right to payment .. ."" Congress intended for a
broader definition of "claim" under the new Code than under the
old Bankruptcy Act. 0 Congress also intended for a broader dis-
charge under Chapter 13 than under Chapter 7.21 In an effort to
remain consistent with these Chapter 13 principles, the bank-
ruptcy court held that the Davenports' restitution order was within
the Code's broad definition of claim,"" that the Davenports' liabil-
ity thereon was a debt,2 and that the debt was subject to the
broad Chapter 13 discharge.3 4 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court
entered an order that the Davenports' criminal restitution obliga-
tion to the Welfare Department was a dischargeable debt.2 '
The bankruptcy court eventually confirmed the Davenports'
Chapter 13 plan without objection from any creditor.2' After suc-
cessful completion of their Chapter 13 plan, the bankruptcy court
discharged the Davenports from bankruptcy.27 The Davenports
were successfully absolved of their criminal restitution sentence.
The Welfare Department filed a notice of appeal to the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania from
the bankruptcy court's order that the Davenports' restitution obli-
gation was a dischargeable debt.2" The district court reversed the
bankruptcy court order and held that a state-imposed criminal res-
titution obligation cannot be discharged in a Chapter 13 proceed-
19. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 310. Section 101(4) of the Code states in full that a claim
is:
A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, eq-
uitable, secured, or unsecured; or
B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to
a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to
judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or
unsecured...
11 USC § 101(4) (West 1985).
20. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 311. Ohio v Kovacs, 469 US 274 (1985). See note 61 and
accompanying text.
21. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 314. The reason for the broader discharge was to en-
courage debtors to opt for chapter 13 as opposed to liquidation under chapter 7. See notes 4,
79 and 124.
22. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 312.
23. 11 USC § 101(11).
24. Davenport, 83 Bankr at 316-17.
25. Id.
26. Davenport, 871 F2d at 422. The Davenports' plan was confirmed on October 20,
1987, not only without an objection from any creditor, but also with the express approval of
the standing chapter 13 trustee. Id.
27. Id. The Davenports were discharged on July 8, 1988. Id.
28. Davenport, 89 Bankr at 428, 429.
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ing.2 The district court chose to follow a recent United States Su-
preme Court case, Kelly v Robinson,80 which held that criminal
restitution sentences were not dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy proceeding.3' The court was also concerned that allowing a
federal bankruptcy court to discharge a state-imposed criminal
sentence would violate important policies of federalism by deter-
ring state courts from imposing restitution sentences, even when
such a sentence would be most appropriate.3' Because of the un-
warranted effect on state criminal courts, as well as the recent de-
cision of Kelly v Robinson, the district court reversed the bank-
ruptcy court and held that state-imposed criminal restitution
sentences were not dischargeable in bankruptcy.8
The Davenports appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit.34 The Third Circuit reversed the district
court and held that restitution orders constitute dischargeable
debts. 5 The court, analyzing the plain language of Chapter 13 of
the Bankruptcy Code, concluded, as the bankruptcy court had ini-
tially, that restitution obligations must be construed as debts3 6 and
must be subject to discharge.
3 7
The Welfare Department appealed to the United States Su-
preme Court and was granted certiorari." The United States Su-
preme Court affirmed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals and held
that criminal restitution obligations are dischargeable debts under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.3 ' The Davenport opinion, de-
29. Id at 429. The district court's decision was dated July 29, 1988. Id at 428.
30. 479 US 36 (1986). See notes 88 through 106 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of Kelly.
31. Davenport, 89 Bankr at 430. See also, Kelly, 479 US at 36.
32. Id at 429-30. Younger v Harris, 401 US 37 (1971).
33. Davenport, 89 Bankr at 430.
34. Davenport, 871 F2d at 421-22. The Davenports' appeal was consolidated with two
other Third Circuit bankruptcy appeals, In re Johnson-Allen and In re Steffier. Id.
35. Id at 428, 429. The Third Circuit's opinion was decided on March 28, 1989 and
denied after a rehearing and a rehearing in banc on April 27, 1989. Id at 421.
36. Id at 423-28. Many of the Third Circuit's concerns were raised by Justice Mar-
shall in the Supreme Court's Davenport opinion and are analyzed relative thereto. See notes
41 through 87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice Marshall's opinion.
37. Davenport, 871 F2d at 428-29. For discussion of the discharge issues, see analysis
of Supreme Court opinion at notes 77 through 82 and accompanying text.
38. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2134. In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court noted a
conflict among bankruptcy courts on the issue of whether restitution obligations constitute
debts. The Court cited In re Kohr, 82 Bankr 706, 712 (M D Pa 1988) (restitution obligations
are not "debts" within the meaning of the Code) and In re Cullens, 77 Bankr 825 (D Colo
1987) (restitution orders are "debts") as representative of the conflict. Davenport, 110 S Ct
at 2130, n.2.
39. Id at 2134.
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livered by Justice Marshall, allowed criminal convicts, who were
sentenced to restitution, to circumvent their sentences by filing
Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.40
Marshall's analysis started with the plain language of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.'" As section 101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code defines
"debt" as "liability on a claim," and section 101(4) defines "claim"
as a "right to payment. . .," Marshall's first inquiry was whether a
criminal restitution sentence constituted a "right to payment."' 2
Though at first glance it might seem obvious that a criminal resti-
tution sentence creates a right to payment, the manner in which
such a sentence is executed strains the parameters of this defini-
tion.43 Typically, the defendant/debtor, who is sentenced to proba-
tion conditioned upon making restitution to the victim, is ordered
to remit payments to a department of probation." The probation
department's responsibilities are two-fold. The probation depart-
ment acts as an escrow agent, receives the payments for the benefit
of the victim, and eventually transfers to the victim the monies
received.45 The probation department also acts as a collection
agent for the victim and, upon default by the defendant on the
restitution obligation, notifies the court, moves for revocation of
the defendant's probation, and seeks to impose upon the defend-
ant a term of imprisonment.4" Such was the arrangement in Dav-
enport.7 The paradox created by such a system is that neither the
probation department nor the victim retains a traditional "right to
payment" in relation to the debtor,'8 as required by the Bank-
ruptcy Code." In Davenport, the Welfare Department, the victim
of the Davenports' crime of fraud, did not retain a right to pay-
ment because the Davenports were ordered to remit payment to
40. Id (Blackmun dissenting).
41. Id at 2130; See also, Landreth Timber Co. v Landreth, 461 US 681, 685 (1985).
42. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2130.
43. Id at 2130-31.
44. Id. See In Re Pellegrino, 42 Bankr 129, 132 (Bankr D Conn 1989). Pellegrino held
that a criminal restitution obligation was nondischargeable. Pelegrino, 42 Bankr at 139.
Pellegrino scrutinized a Connecticut restitution procedure similar to the Pennsylvania pro-
cedure relative to Davenport. Id at 132. Compare Conn Gen Stat Ann § 53a-30(b) (West
1985) and 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1106(e) (Purdon 1983).
45. 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1106(e) (Purdon 1985).
46. Id.
47. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2129-30.
48. Id at 2131. See also, Commonwealth v Mourar, 349 Pa Super 583, 603, 504 A2d
197, 208 (1986), rev'd on other grounds 517 Pa 83, 534 A2d 1050 (1987).
49. 11 USC § 101(4).
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the Probation Department."° The Probation Department did not
retain a right to payment because the Probation Department's sole
remedy in the event of a default on the Davenports' restitution
sentence was a motion to revoke probation." Neither the proba-
tion department nor the victim stood in a traditional debtor/credi-
tor relationship with the Davenports because neither could de-
mand payment of their restitution obligation.2 Moreover, the
primary purpose of restitution is to serve the state's interest in
punishment and rehabilitation." Compensation to the victim for
actual pecuniary loss is merely a secondary purpose of restitu-
tion." Since compensation to the victim is the aspect of restitution
which creates the right to payment, when this aspect is viewed as
collateral, then restitution loses its debt-oriented character."'
Based on these circumstances, the Welfare Department argued
that the Davenports' restitution obligation may not be viewed as a
debt," and therefore may not be subject to discharge,' because it
did not constitute a right to payment pursuant to section 101(4) of
the Bankruptcy Code."
In holding that a criminal restitution obligation constitutes a
dischargeable debt, Marshall felt that the above described circum-
stances did not bear on the Court's construction of the phrase
"right to payment."' 9 Marshall saw no reference to purpose in the
definitional language of the Code." Congress intended a broad
concept of debt.6' Marshall stated that, "the plain meaning of a
'right to payment' is nothing more nor less than an enforceable
50. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2129. See also, 18 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1106(e) (Purdon
1985).
51. 42 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 9771 (Purdon 1981).
52. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2131; see also Mourar, 504 A2d at 208.
53. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2131.
54. Id. This argument is frequently raised in reference to the section 523(a)(7) excep-
tion to discharge. Under section 523(a)(7), criminal penalties are excepted to discharge so
long as such penalties are not for compensation of actual pecuniary loss. For a discussion on
whether restitution obligations are actually compensation for pecuniary loss see note 105.
See also, Kelly, 107 S Ct at 362.
55. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2131; see also Kelly, 110 S Ct at 362.
56. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2132.
57. 11 USC § 1328.
58. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2131.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2130, 2133; HR Rep No 95-595 at 309, 1978 USCCAN at
6266 (1978) (describing definition of "claim" as "broadest possible" and noting that the
Code "contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor ... will be able to be dealt with
in the bankruptcy case"); accord S Rep No 95-989, at 22, 1978 USCCAN at 5808 (1978).
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obligation, regardless of the objectives the State seeks to serve in
imposing the obligation."' Nor did Marshall find the state's
method of enforcing restitution obligations as suggesting that resti-
tution debts do not create claims." In response to the argument
that neither the probation department, nor the victim, can enforce
a restitution obligation in a civil proceeding by compelling pay-
ment of its exact amount in dollars," Marshall stated that a crimi-
nal restitution debt is, nevertheless, enforceable by foreclosure on
a far greater security interest, namely, the debtor's freedom.6" Re-
jecting the arguments based on the purpose of restitution, as well
as the manner of enforcing restitution, Marshall held that restitu-
tion orders are within the scope of section 101 of the Bankruptcy
Code, and thus are subject to discharge."
Marshall next addressed whether restitution debts may be en-
forced outside of the bankruptcy proceeding in spite of the "auto-
matic stay" provision of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code,"
which prevents creditors from pursuing debtors while under the ju-
risdiction of the bankruptcy court." Marshall acknowledged two
competing attributes of section 362. First, the Senate report per-
taining to section 362(b)(1) stated that, "the bankruptcy laws are
not a haven for criminal offenders."' But second, Marshall noted
that section 362(b)(1) does not explicitly exempt governmental ef-
forts to collect restitution obligations from a debtor.7 0 In an amicus
curiae brief filed in support of the Welfare Department, 71 the
United States argued that "it would be anomalous to construe the
62. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2131.
63. Id.
64. Id; see also, Mourar, 504 A2d at 208.
65. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2131.
66. Id.
67. 11 USC § 362.
68. 110 S Ct at 2131-32. In order to grant the bankruptcy court an opportunity to
effectively administer the bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to enjoin
all debt collection activities pertaining to the assets of the debtor. 2 Collier on Bankruptcy
§ 362.01 (1990); Ex Parte Christy, 44 US 292 (1845). Section 362 of the bankruptcy code
"stays" an array of debt enforcement and collection procedures which would interfere with
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over the debtor's bankruptcy estate. 11 USC § 362. Most
relevant to the criminal restitution situation is section 362(b)(1), which exempts from the
stay, "commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the
debtor." 11 USC § 362(b). The precise question in Davenport was: Whether the Probation
Department's pursuit of the Davenports and collection of the Davenports' restitution debt
was exempted from the automatic stay? Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2132.
69. Id at 2131-32; S Rep No 95.989 at 51, 1978 USCCAN at 5837 (1978).
70. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2132; 11 USC § 362(b)(2).
71. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2131
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Code as eliminating a haven for criminal offenders under the auto-
matic stay provision while granting them sanctuary from restitu-
tion obligations under Chapter 13. '1 " Marshall did not find the sit-
uation at all anomalous. 7 3 It is one thing to permit criminal
prosecutions simultaneously with bankruptcy proceedings and
quite another to allow probation officials to obstruct the debtor's
reorganization under Chapter 13. Here Marshall detected a policy
choice favoring a debtor's interest in full and complete release of
his obligations7' over society's interest in collecting a restitution
obligation in contravention to the Chapter 13 program.7
Marshall finally analyzed the discharge provisions of the Code
relative to criminal restitution.77 Section 1328 sets forth the Chap-
ter 13 discharge provisions.78 One of the primary ways in which
Congress secured a broader discharge under Chapter 13 than
Chapter 7 was by excluding most of the Chapter 7 discharge excep-
tions from section 1328.79 Marshall found it highly significant that
72. Id at 2132.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 11 USC § 1328(a); see note 4.
76. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2132.
77. Id at 2132-33. Prior to this crucial analysis of section 1328 of the Code, Marshall
addressed some ambiguous arguments set forth by the United States, arguing as amicus
relating to sections 726 and 523 of the Code.
Both sections 726 and 523 set forth provisions for treatment of fines or penalties. Section
726(a)(4) provides that fines and penalties, which are not compensation for pecuniary loss,
are to be afforded a relatively low priority in the distribution of a debtor's bankruptcy es-
tate. Section 523(a)(7) excepts from discharge a debt, "to the extent such debt is for a fine,
penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not com-
pensation for actual pecuniary loss." The United States asserted that section 726 must not
apply to criminal penalties, and must instead be restricted to civil penalties, because it
would be anomalous to afford the government disfavored treatment in the distribution of
the debtor's estate. The United States simultaneously argued that section 523(a)(7) must
apply to criminal penalties, so that criminal restitution debts would be excepted from dis-
charge. The United States thereby urged two different interpretations of the phrase, "fines,
penalties, and forfeitures." Marshall contended that the phrase "fine, penalty, or forfeiture"
could not have different meanings in different sections of the bankruptcy code. Both section
523(a)(7) and section 726 must be read to apply to both criminal and civil penalties. Mar-
shall adopted the interpretation that criminal fines payable to governmental units receive a
low priority in distribution under section 726(a)(4) and are excepted from discharge in a
chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding under section 523(a)(7).
78. 11 USC § 1328(a).
79. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2132. See note 4. Compare section 523(a) which sets forth
numerous chapter 7 discharge exceptions [including but not limited to exceptions pertaining
to tax debts ( section 523(a)(1)), fraud debts (section 523(a)(4)), alimony and child support
debts (section 523(a)(5)), willful injury debts (section 523(a)(6)), criminal fines and penalty
debts (section 523(a)(7)), and educational loan debts (section 523(a)(8))], with section
1328(a), which stated in full, at the time of the Davenport opinion:
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Congress did incorporate one of the section 523 Chapter 7 dis-
charge exceptions into Chapter 13 by way of section 1328,0 but
that the section 523(a)(7) exception pertaining to criminal fines
and penalties was one of the Chapter 7 discharge exceptions which
Congress chose not to incorporate. 8' Had Congress intended crimi-
nal restitution sentences to be excepted from discharge in Chapter
13, Marshall would have expected Congress to express that intent
by incorporating section 523(a)(7) into section 1328(a).82
Marshall's opinion in Davenport may be summarized as follows.
Criminal restitution orders fall under the Bankruptcy Code's broad
definition of "debt."' s Criminal restitution sentences create a right
to payment.' Since collection of criminal restitution payments is
not expressly exempted from the automatic stay, the goals of
Chapter 13 are best served when collection of criminal restitution
is subject to the stay.s6 Criminal restitution payments are not ex-
cepted from discharge in Chapter 13 proceedings, as they are in
Chapter 7 proceedings, because section 1328(a) affords the Chapter
13 debtor a broader discharge than the Chapter 7 debtor.8" There-
fore, a criminal restitution sentence may be discharged in a Chap-
ter 13 proceeding.'
Marshall's opinion was in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court's
1986 opinion in Kelly v Robinson." The facts in Kelly were nearly
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments under the
plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor
after the order for relief under this chapter, the court shall grant the debtor a dis-
charge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed under section 502 of this
title, except any debt-
(1) provided for under section 1322(b)(5) of this title; or
(2) of the kind specified in section 523(a)(5) of this title.
80. Section 523(a)(5) excepting child support and alimony payments from discharge
was incorporated into section 1328(a). See note 79.
81. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2133. See note 79.
82. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2133. Marshall's reasoning regarding the absence of sec-
tion 523(a)(7) from section 1328(a) foreshadows the amendments to the Code resulting from
the Drunk Driving Victims' Protection Act, discussed at notes 128 through 134 and accom-
panying text.
83. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2130-31.
84. Id.
85. Id at 2131-32.
86. Id at 2133.
87. Id at 2129.
88. Kelly, 107 S Ct at 353. The discussion and analysis herein of Kelly can be treated
equally as a discussion and analysis of the dissent in Davenport. The dissent in Davenport
approached the criminal restitution discharge problem, as well as the Bankruptcy Code in
general, identically as the majority opinion in Kelly. Compare Davenport, 110 S Ct 2134-38
and Kelly, 107 S Ct at 355-63. See discussion at notes 118 through 123 and accompanying
408
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identical to the facts in Davenport.s" In Kelly, Carolyn Robinson
pleaded guilty to second degree larceny arising out of her wrongful
receipt of welfare benefits from the Connecticut Department of In-
come Maintenance." Robinson was sentenced to a suspended
prison term and placed on probation conditioned upon restitution
payments to the state of Connecticut Office of Adult Probation.'
Thereafter, Robinson filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, listing
the restitution obligation as a debt, in the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut."2 When the probation
and welfare departments denied that the bankruptcy proceeding
affected the terms of Robinson's probation, Robinson filed an ad-
versary complaint in bankruptcy court.'8 After its hearing, the
bankruptcy court, relying heavily on an identical case from their
jurisdiction, In Re Pellegrino," held that Robinson's discharge did
not pertain to her restitution sentence."o The district court
adopted the bankruptcy court's opinion." Robinson appealed to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' 7which reversed and held that
criminal restitution obligations are dischargeable debts under the
Bankruptcy Code." The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court
and held that criminal restitution orders are excepted from dis-
charge pursuant to section 523(a)(7) in chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceedings."
Kelly was representative of a line of Supreme Court bankruptcy
decisions calling for a continuation of bankruptcy practice as it ex-
isted before the new Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978.1" The
Kelly opinion analyzed the dischargeability of criminal restitution
sentences by considering, "the language of sections 101 and 523 in
light of the history of bankruptcy court deference to criminal judg-
ments and in light of the interests of the states in unfettered ad-
ministration of their criminal justice systems."' 01 The Kelly Court
text.
89. Compare Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2129-30, and Kelly, 107 S Ct 335-57.
90. Kelly, 107 S Ct at 355.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id at 356.
94. See note 44.
95. Robinson v. McGuire, 45 Bankr 423 (Bankr D Conn 1984).
96. Kelly, 107 S Ct at 357.
97. Id.
98. In Re Robinson, 776 F2d 30 (2d Cir 1985).
99. Kelly, 107 S Ct at 357.
100. See discussion at note 119 and accompanying text.
101. Kelly, 107 S Ct at 358.
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found that, "Congress enacted the Code in 1978 against the back-
ground of an established judicial exception to discharge from crim-
inal sentences, including restitution orders." ' In light of the his-
torical nondischargeability of criminal restitution sentences, Kelly
stated that this practice could only be changed by explicit congres-
sional intent.103 While the Court doubted that Congress intended
for criminal restitution sentences to fall within the Code's new and
broader concept of debt, the Court passed on this question. ' " In-
stead, the Kelly Court held that criminal restitution sentences
were preserved from discharge by the section 523(a)(7) discharge
exception pertaining to governmental fines.105 The import of the
Kelly decision was nevertheless obvious when the Court concluded:
In light of the strong interest of the states, the uniform construction of the
old Act over three-quarters of a century, and the absence of any significant
evidence that Congress intended to change the law in this area, we believe
this result best effectuates the will of Congress.'"
The Kelly Court's reluctance to believe in the plain meaning of the
new Bankruptcy Code led them to solace in old-time bankruptcy
practice.
The impetus for the Kelly Court's manner of interpreting the
Code was the 1986 Supreme Court opinion in Midlantic National
102. Id at 359; Kelly cited in support of pre-Code non-dischargeability of restitution
sentences State v Mosesson, 78 Misc2d 217, 218, 356 NYS2d 483, 484 (1974) and the "lead-
ing case" of In re Moore, 111 F 145, 148-49 (W D Ky 1901).
103. Kelly, 107 S Ct at 359-60. The Court assumed this posture based on the Bank-
ruptcy Code interpretation rules recently prescribed in Midlantic Nation Bank. See notes
107 through 113 and accompanying text, for a discussion of Midlantic National Bank.
104. Kelly, 107 S Ct at 361. The Court stated:
We recognize . . .that the Code's definition of "debt" is broadly drafted, and that
the legislative history, as well as the Code's various priority and dischargeability pro-
visions, support a broad reading of the definition. But nothing in the legislative his-
tory of these sections compels the conclusion that Congress intended to change the
state of the law with respect to criminal judgments.
Id at 361, n.12.
105. Id at 361-62. The Court offered a tortured construction of section 523(a)(7). The
Court stated that section 523(a)(7) protects from discharge any debt- "to the extent such
debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental
unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss." Id at 361 (emphasis added).
The Kelly Court stated that restitution orders are not for compensating the victim but for
rehabilitating the offender, and therefore are not compensation for actual pecuniary loss. Id
at 361. The Court further argued that restitution is intended to benefit society as a whole
more than it is intended to benefit the individual victim. Id. Based on these arguments, the
Kelly Court managed to opine that restitution sentences are not compensation for pecuniary
loss and therefore are not excluded from the section 523(a)(3) exception to discharge for
fines and penalties payable to governmental units. Id at 361-62.
106. Id at 363.
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Bank v New Jersey Dept. of Environmental Protection.07 In
Midlantic, environmentally contaminated property of the debtor
had become burdensome and a financial detriment as a result of an
expensive government clean-up order.'" The trustee sought to
abandon the contaminated property under the abandonment pow-
ers of section 554(a).109 Pursuant to section 554(a) of the Code, a
trustee of a debtor's bankruptcy estate may abandon any property
that is burdensome or of no benefit. 10 Justice Powell reviewed
three cases under the old act which suggested that the trustee's
abandonment power was impliedly restricted when the abandon-
ment would interfere with governmental interests."' Finding no
specific language in the Code overruling these cases, Justice Powell
held that the trustee could not abandon the property in ques-
tion." 2 The Court stated:
The normal rule of statutory construction is that if Congress intends for
legislation to change the interpretation of a judicially created concept, it
makes that intent specific. The Court has followed this rule with particular
care in constructing the scope of bankruptcy codifications. If Congress
wishes to grant the trustee an extraordinary exemption from nonbankruptcy
law, '[sic] the intention would be clearly expressed, not left to be collected
or inferred from disputable considerations of convenience in administering
the estate of the bankrupt."'
This rule of Bankruptcy Code interpretation, recited in Midlan-
tic and Kelly, was later espoused once again in Justice O'Connor's
dissenting opinion in In Re Ron Pair."4 The majority opinion in
Ron Pair could not deny that section 506 of the Code granted an
oversecured creditor post-petition interest on its claim, in spite of
the pre-Code practice against post-petition interest."' However,
107. 474 US 494 (1986).
108. Midlantic, 474 US at 497.
109. Id.
110. 11 USC § 554(a).
111. Midlantic, 474 US at 500-01; Ottenheminer v Whitaker, 198 F2d 289 (4th Cir
1952); In Re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F2d 1 (7th Cir 1942), cert denied, sub nom
Chicago Junction R. Co. v Sprague, 317 US 683 (1942); In Re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 BCD 277
(Bankr E D Pa 1974).
112. Midlantic, 474 US at 505.
113. Id (quoting Swarts v Hammer, 194 US 441 (1904)). (Citations omitted.)
114. - US...., 109 S Ct 1026 (1989).
115. Ron Pair, 109 S Ct at 1032-33. 11 USC § 506(b) states:
(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of
which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the
amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on
such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agree-
ment under which such claim arose.
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O'Connor's dissent once again called for an examination of pre-
Code practice, a search for an express overruling of pre-Code prac-
tice, and, absent an express overruling, continuation of the pre-
Code practice.1 6 In Ron Pair, Justice O'Connor found sufficient
ambiguity in section 506(b) to continue the pre-Code practice of
denying post-petition interest on claims.1
7
After the Midlantic, Kelly, and Ron Pair decisions, the Court
was on the verge of adopting an arduous method of reading the
Bankruptcy Code. As Professor Yochum has explained:
This method, which has the support of nearly half the Court, requires (for
how many centuries?) to discover first whether there was a pre-Code prac-
tice . . .If the Code seems to vary that result, no language, however plain,
will insulate the provision from the charge of ambiguity and the jurist's re-
working. Changes in prior law are only to be effected, in this view, if the
Code's legislative history indicates an awareness of the pre-Code practice
and a willingness to change it. Merely rewriting the statute itself is insuffi-
cient to change the law.""
Professor Yochum is not alone in his criticism of the Supreme
Court's approach to the Bankruptcy Code. Professor Tabb con-
tends that: "Giving controlling weight to the provisions of prior
law in the face of contrary provisions in the new law seem
anomalous."1 9
Davenport was surprising because Davenport employed an op-
posite approach from that espoused in the recent Supreme Court
bankruptcy decisions of Kelly, Midlantic, and Ron Pair. Mar-
shall's opinion in Davenport gave no deference to pre-Code prac-
tice. Marshall, unafraid of new bankruptcy practices and unintimi-
dated by the language of the new Code, decided to accept the plain
meaning of the Code and concluded that a criminal restitution ob-
ligation was a dischargeable debt.2 0
The divergent approaches of Kelly and Davenport leave bank-
ruptcy practitioners in a position of unpredictability and uncer-
11 USC § 506(b).
116. Ron Pair, 109 S Ct at 1034.
117. Id at 1036-37.
118. Mark D. Yochum, How We Read the Bankruptcy Code, Juris 10, 12 (Summer
1990). Yochum noted the absurdity of this procedure given that Collier's was often the only
source of old Act law. Id. Professor Yochum is a tax professor at Duquesne University
School of Law.
119. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49 U
Pitt L Rev 477, 573 (1988). Professor Tabb is an assistant professor of law at the University
of Illinois College of Law.
120. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2130; see also, Landreth Timber Co. v Landreth, 471 US
681 (1985) (case instructing the Court to analyze the plain meaning of the Code).
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tainty." I Must a bankruptcy attorney examine pre-Code bank-
ruptcy practice each time he or she is about to rely upon a
provision of the new Code? Would a lawyer be held negligent for
relying on the plain meaning of the new Code? At a minimum, if
the Supreme Court renders more decisions in the Kelly manner,
then the positive innovations of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 will eventually be eroded to a reversion of anachronistic pre-
Code treatment of bankrupt businesses and individuals. Hopefully,
forthcoming Supreme Court bankruptcy decisions will resolve
these dilemmas by declaring explicitly the direction in which bank-
ruptcy practitioners should turn: forward or backward.
Aside from the Bankruptcy Code interpretation problems cre-
ated by Davenport, on a rudimentary level, Davenport highlighted
a serious conflict between the goals of bankruptcy courts and the
goals of criminal courts.' The purpose of Chapter 13 is to provide
a "fresh start" for debtors and an attractive alternative to liquida-
tion. '2 Unfortunately, in order to facilitate these important con-
gressionally-authorized goals, many of the debts which survive dis-
charge under Chapter 7, can not survive discharge under Chapter
13.1"' Some of the debts which haven't survived a Chapter 13 dis-
charge are restitution for first degree theft,"15 restitution for burn-
ing down a building, 2 6 and restitution for motor vehicle theft.1
2
7
Perhaps the greatest criminal injustice arising out of the broad
discharge provision of Chapter 13 concerns drunk driving. Dorothy
Mercer was struck brutally by a drunk driver travelling over 100
miles per hour with twice the legal limit of alcohol in his blood.
Dorothy suffered permanent brain damage and a compression of
the spine that caused her to lose three inches in height. The drunk
driver filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition so that he could fully
discharge a future restitution debt without paying Dorothy a
penny. Dorothy was forced to settle for a fraction of what she de-
121. Yochum, Juris at 10, 12 (cited in note 118); see also, Tabb, 49 U Pitt L R 477
(cited in note 119).
122. Susan Jensen-Conklin, Nondischargeable Debts in Chapter 13: "Fresh Start" or
"Haven for Criminals," 7 Bankr Dev J 517 (Fall 1990).
123. See note 4.
124. At the time Davenport was decided only one of the many section 523 exceptions
were incorporated into chapter 13 through section 1328(a). See discussion at note 79.
125. Turner v Carroll (In re.Carroll), 61 Bankr 178 (Bankr D Or 1986).
126. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v Tackberry (In re Tackberry), 13 Bankr 881
(Bankr D Minn 1981).
127. Cullens v District Court of Colo. (In re Cuilens), 77 Bankr 825 (Bankr D Colo
1987). See Jensen-Conklin, 7 Bankr Dev J at 536-47 (cited in note 122).
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served. The drunk driver's bankruptcy tactic was successful. 2 '
Because Dorothy's case was only one of the more than 20,000
such cases in America each year,12' Congress recently passed the
Drunk Driving Victims' Protection Act.130 The Drunk Driving Vic-
tims' Protection Act made several amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code, in order to prevent individuals, who have been victimized by
drunk drivers, from being victimized a second time by the Bank-
ruptcy Code.131 One of the central changes was the following
amendment:
1328. Discharge
(a) ... the Court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts .. except
any debt-
(3) for restitution included in a sentence on the debtor's conviction
of a crime.131
By this amendment Congress filled in the gap illuminated by
Davenport. In Davenport, the Davenports' criminal restitution
sentence was held dischargeable by Justice Marshall because the
section 523(a)(7) Chapter 7 exception to discharge, pertaining to
criminal fines and penalties, had not been incorporated into Chap-
ter 13 through section 1328(a). 33 The Drunk Driving Victims' Pro-
tection Act made the necessary amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code by writing into section 1328(a) an explicit exception to dis-
charge in Chapter 13 proceedings for criminal restitution
sentences.
The Senate Report acknowledged that the Drunk Driving Vic-
tim's Protection Act dealt a fatal blow to Davenport in terms of
the dischargeability of criminal restitution sentences.'" Only time
128. Drunk Driving Victims' Protection Act, S Rep No 101-434, 101st Cong, 2nd Sess
4 (1990).
129. Id at 3.
130. The Drunk Driving Victims' Protection Act became effective on November 15,
1990 and is now PL 101-581. Bill S 1931 was passed in the Senate in September of 1990 and
then was revised in the House. The Act was finally passed by the Senate on October 27,
1990. The Bill was introduced by Senators Biden, Danforth, and Thurmond of the Judiciary
Committee. Cong Rec, No 150- Part III, S 17654, October 27, 1990.
131. Id. See statement of Senator Biden and references to Mother's Against Drunk
Driving (MADD].
132. 11 USC § 1328 (emphasis added).
133. Davenport, 110 S Ct at 2133. See discussion at notes 77 through 82 and accompa-
nying text.
134. The Senate Report explicitly stated:
The amendment offered by Senator Grassley will have the combined effect of barring
the use of chapter 13 by convicted criminals seeking to discharge court-ordered resti-
tution payments, and of codifying Kelly v. Robinson, 479 US 36 (1986). Additionally,
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will tell if the Act has any impact on how the Supreme Court reads
the Bankruptcy Code.
Stuart Levine
this amendment will have the effect of overruling the Supreme Court's decision in
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare v. Davenport, which held that criminal
restitution obligations are dischargeable debts under chapter 13.
S Rep 101-434 at 8 (emphasis added).
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